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Next Step: State Funding? 
 
Justin Fisher (Brunel University) 
 
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 marked the most 
comprehensive and radical overhaul of British party finance for over 100 years. It 
instituted reforms in many areas with the notable exception of the comprehensive 
extension of state funding for political parties. However, despite the radicalism of the 
Act, questions have already arisen as to whether the further state funding should 
occur. This article argues that in order to examine the case for more comprehensive 
state funding, policy makers need to look beyond the current calls and make a 
decision by evaluating several criteria on an empirical, rather than an assumed basis. 
First, however, it is worth outlining the stage we are at presently by summarising the 
new Act, looking at its impact to date and examining the claims made in recent 
episodes which have led to calls for more comprehensive state funding of political 
parties. 
 
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
The provisions in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act were based 
almost entirely upon the recommendations of the Fifth Report of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life (the Neill Committee) published in 1998. Given the abject 
failure of previous attempts to reform party finance during the last twenty-five years, 
the radicalism and comprehensiveness of the Report was a genuine surprise. Not only 
did the Committee engage in a very thorough examination, it also produced its report 
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very quickly. Yet perhaps even more surprisingly, the recommendations received all 
party support, a factor which contributed to the proposals becoming law. 
 Given that British party finance was virtually unregulated beforehand, it is worth 
outlining the extent of the reforms.
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 First, an Electoral Commission was established to 
oversee the implementation of the law relevant to party finance, as well as for other 
electoral matters including overseeing electoral boundaries, the registration of parties 
and designated organisations, the regulations pertaining to elections, and the use of 
advertising in elections. Major parties will now be required to submit audited accounts to 
the Commission based upon identical time periods in a standard format. These will 
subsequently be made available for public inspection. In addition, parties must make 
regular declarations regarding election expenditure and donations. 
 Secondly, the Act regulates political donations. It specifies that gifts to parties in 
excess of £5,000 nationally and £1,000 locally are now publicly declared. Importantly, 
this includes ‘in kind’ payments. Declaration is quarterly during non-election periods 
and weekly during general elections. Anonymous donations to parties in excess of £200 
are now prohibited, as are ‘blind trusts’ and foreign donations. Contributions are only 
permitted from permissible sources
2
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 Thirdly, one of Act’s most radical clauses was to limit campaign spending at 
national level in general elections. Hitherto, only constituency campaign expenditure 
had been regulated. One problem with a national limit is the definition of when a 
campaign begins. For the purposes of the Act, the campaign was defined officially as 
the 365 days preceding polling day in a general election, with the spending ceiling 
initially set at £30,000 per contested constituency. Thus, if a party contested all 641 
seats in Britain, the ceiling would be £19,230,000. The spending cap was a surprise 
move, given that of all the regulations this was most likely to attract attempts to find 
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loopholes, but the Neill Committee’s justification was one similar to that imposed at 
constituency level. The analogy was with speed limits. A 30mph speed limit will not 
prevent drivers travelling at 35mph, but it is likely to prevent speeds of 50mph. 
Spending limits will also apply to non-Westminster elections, though the definition of 
campaign periods differs. In European elections, this will be £45,000 per MEP in a 
region; in Scotland, £12,000 per constituency contested plus £80,000 per contested 
region; in Wales, £10,000 per contested constituency plus £40,000 per contested region; 
and in Northern Ireland, £17,000 per contested constituency. 
 
State Funding 
Despite the radicalism of these provisions, the Neill Committee rejected 
comprehensive state funding on the grounds that the case was not sufficiently 
compelling. Instead, the spending caps were designed to reduce the need for income. 
That said, state assistance was, at least, extended. Firstly, following the 
recommendations of Neill, ‘Short’ money was increased by a factor of 2.7 in 1999. 
Secondly, within the Act, a Policy Development Fund was established, initially cash 
limited to £2 million per annum, to assist parties to engage more fully on policy 
development.  
In addition, of course, parties have enjoyed limited state support for many 
years. Such subsidies include free election mailings, free use of public halls, state 
security at party conferences and the larger parties, free broadcasting airtime for a 
controlled number of party broadcasts.
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 Yet though improved in recent years, these 
subsidies are still modest compared with many other Western countries, (Nassmacher, 
1993). More importantly, with the exception of new Policy Development Fund, 
almost all operate only at the time of elections. The problem for parties is that their 
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financial needs are constant, and therefore such subsidies are of only modest financial 
benefit. 
 
What has been the impact of the new legislation? 
At the most basic level, the new Act has introduced a degree of transparency into 
party donations that did not previously exist. For the student of party finance this has 
been nothing short of a godsend, given the paucity of data previously available. At a 
more advanced level however, we can evaluate the impact of the new legislation on 
one general election (2001). Obviously, this cannot provide the basis of a truly 
comprehensive evaluation, but nevertheless some useful observations can be made.
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First, it is doubtful that the new spending caps made any decisive difference to 
party fortunes, especially as the spending gap between the main parties and the Liberal 
Democrats remained very wide. Instead, the principal impact is likely to have been one 
of changing the proportions spent on campaign items, rather than levelling the electoral 
playing field. The new limit imposed opportunity costs. If one million was spent on A, 
then that was one million that could not be spent on B or C. Thus, parties had to review 
their spending in order that it should be most effective. Interestingly, the two main 
parties did not concur on which campaign techniques were regarded as being most likely 
to accomplish their aims. 
 Yet, it is also clear is that campaigning is not just a function of what parties do 
themselves. Both Labour and the Conservatives received significant news coverage for 
campaign techniques in which they invested relatively little. Labour did not spend a 
great deal on electronic campaigning (like text messages to mobile phones), but gained a 
great deal of coverage from it. The Conservatives erected their final campaign poster 
(urging voters to prevent a second Labour landslide) on only twenty sites, but its 
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contents shaped the final week of the campaign. As a consequence, it may be argued that 
the continued regulation of campaign broadcasting to ensure broad equity is essential if 
the new regulations are to have any success in evening out any impact of electoral 
spending.  
 Secondly, compliance with the new legislation inevitably caused a few 
problems given the extent of the new regulations. To some extent these difficulties 
were anticipated by the Act. One-off start-up grants were made available to assist 
parties in meeting the costs of compliance.
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 Nevertheless, local parties did face a few 
problems – particularly with the heavier workload, which accompanied the changes to 
postal voting, and rolling registration. Despite these difficulties, parties adapted well to 
the new regulations, overall. There were some uncertainties, notably the status of some 
forms of donations ‘in kind’. Nevertheless, the indications are that the regulations, both 
in spirit and actuality, were observed and of course, it should be easier for parties to 
comprehend the legislation in future elections. 
 
The continuation of party finance ‘episodes’ 
Despite the new legislation, there continue to be concerns about the probity of party 
finance. Indeed, the regular appearance of these has prompted some to call for further 
state funding. Yet before we evaluate such a call, it is worth first outlining some of the 
main episodes since the Act was passed.  
 
‘Large’ Donations 
 First, prior to the act coming into force, both main parties revealed that they 
had received substantial donations – Labour had received three totalling £6 million, 
the Conservatives one of £5 million. A further donation of £5 million was made to the 
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latter just days before the 2001 general election. There followed some disquiet at the 
size of these donations, even prompting the chair of the Electoral Commission to 
suggest that the question of donation caps might be re-examined in future.  
 Large donations can be problematic. There may be democratic concerns where 
a party receives a considerable proportion of its income from one or few sources and 
public confidence may not be reassured by the fact that these sources may provide such a 
significant proportion of the party’s income.  Yet arguably, the problem of ‘big’ 
donations may be overstated. Large donations tend to generate the most publicity, but 
can distort the broader picture. For example, using the Electoral Commission’s data 
for donations during the whole of 2001 (or at least from February, when the new Act 
came into force), we do indeed find that some large donations were made. The 
Conservatives received the largest – there were three donations in excess of £1 
million and a further five of over £100,000. For Labour, there were no donations from 
companies or individuals in excess of £200,000, though five trade unions contributed 
over £6.4 million centrally over the course of the year. The Liberal Democrats 
received only one donation in excess of £100,000. Most donations for all parties were, 
however, far smaller. That said, for the Conservatives in particular, there is clearly the 
concern that a significant proportion of their donated income came from very few 
sources, the top three alone accounting for £8.5 million. 
 
‘Cash for Favours’ 
 A second concern is where there have been donations where suggestions have 
been made that preferential treatment has been given to donors. Four such episodes 
have occurred in recent months. First, it emerged that the collapsed energy company 
Enron had sponsored Labour Party events since 1997 to the sum of around £36,000. 
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The company had acquired Wessex Water without a regulatory review and had had a 
number of meetings with senior officials over British energy policy. Secondly in 
2001, the Prime Minister wrote a letter in support of LNM Holdings, in their efforts to 
acquire a Romanian steel company. The owner of the company, Lakshmi Mittal had 
previously made a donation to the Labour Party of £125,000. Thirdly, after the award 
of a £32 million government contract for a smallpox vaccine was awarded to 
Powderject, it emerged that the Chairman and Chief Executive, Paul Drayson had 
made two separate donations to Labour of £50,000. Finally, following the successful 
take-over of Express Group newspapers by the Northern and Shell group (which was 
not contested by the Department of Trade and Industry) the owner, Richard Desmond 
made a donation to Labour of £100,000. Further embarrassment was caused by the 
fact that Mr. Desmond’s group also publishes pornographic material. In response to 
these episodes (particularly the latter), Labour set up an ethics committee to vet all 
large donations and stipulate that all donors agree that their donations is not intended 
to delivery commercial advantage. 
 For all that, however, it is worth noting three points. First, in all cases, the 
preferential treatment was assumed rather than demonstrated. For example, Paul 
Drayson was an existing Labour supporter and had made previous donations, whilst in 
the case of Richard Desmond, the donation was made after the favour was supposed 
to have been done. Whilst one cannot wholly rule out wrongdoing, it is typical of 
many investigations into party finance that coincidence is regarded as adequate causal 
evidence (this lapse was also true of many accusations about Conservative finances in 
the 1980s and 1990s)
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. Secondly, in all cases bar the first (Enron), the donation was 
made by an individual, rather than the company which benefited. To be sure, those 
individuals would also benefit if their companies were successful, but again the link 
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between donation and favour (if it exists at all) becomes less direct than accusers 
claim.  
 Finally, the size of some of these donations was relatively modest. Of course, 
all donations are welcome, but it does, for example, stretch credibility to suggest that 
British energy policy might be changed in return for sponsorship to the tune of 
£36,000 over a period of years. Yet, for all that, while these episodes do not 
necessarily suggest that impropriety has taken place, they all have the potential to 
damage public confidence – especially when as here, they appear in close succession 
and thereby create a cumulative effect. As a result, calls have come for the 
introduction of state funding of parties – the expectation being that this would prevent 
such episodes. In order to assess the case for state funding, however, we need to 
consider more than just these episodes. Essentially, there are at least three questions 
which we should consider: Would state funding provide a solution to public disquiet? 
Does the voluntary system of funding parties provide adequate income? and Does 
greater party spending lead to electoral payoffs? 
 
Should State Funding be Extended? 
Would state funding provide a ‘cure’ for the recent episodes? 
In short, it is unlikely that state funding would have prevented such episodes (scandals 
is too strong a word). Repeated comparative evidence points to continued problems of 
this kind despite the existence of comprehensive state funding. That said, there may 
be a case for arguing that the British experience would be more positive. Despite the 
comparative lack of regulation in the past, Britain has been notably free of party 
finance scandals. Of course, some might argue that the lack of regulation has meant 
that little information about donations has been available and thus ‘wrongdoing’ may 
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well have occurred without our knowledge. Certainly, the newly available data means 
that new episodes may come to light as in the case of Paul Drayson. So in a sense, the 
new regulations may actually contribute to public disquiet. On the other hand, given 
that data about donors are now freely available, one wonders whether any donor intent 
on seeking benefits, or indeed any party willing to grant them, would risk such a 
move given the likely unwelcome glare of publicity.  
However, what comprehensive state funding would do is relieve parties to an 
extent from the need to seek funds from anyone and everyone and would allow 
legislation to limit the size of donations without crippling the parties financially. As 
things stand, parties’ need for income means that are less likely to be selective about 
from whom they receive donations. Limiting the size of donations without providing 
an alternative form of income, however, would be likely to result in parties going 
bankrupt. 
 
Is Voluntary Income sufficient? 
The absence of comprehensive state funding means that the bulk of party finances are 
based upon voluntary income. This creates certain problems, however. First, most 
expenditure for British political parties is routine, generally constituting around 80 per 
cent of both Conservative and Labour central expenditure. Thus, in order simply to 
maintain themselves as viable organisations, parties require some consistent financial 
input. Secondly, the notion of an electoral cycle every four to five years in British 
politics is something of a misnomer, at least as far as parties are concerned. Whilst 
parties do concentrate most resources and interest upon general elections, they also 
campaign on a national basis in European elections and across large proportions of the 
country in the various staggered local elections as well as in the new devolved 
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institutions. All in all, party expenditure, whilst peaking at the times of general 
elections, is nevertheless something of a constant.  
 Party income, on the other hand, follows the general election cycle, leading to 
parties struggling to fulfil their financial obligations and routinely finding themselves in 
deficit. Worse, parties cannot enhance their income via good performance. No matter 
how well or badly parties perform, their finances are unaffected and therefore any 
assumption that parties may have control over their income by virtue of their 
performance is undermined. As a result, the basis of voluntary income as an effective 
means of distributing funds to competing parties is open to serious question.
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 Overall 
then, the problem for parties is not that they have too much money, it is that they have 
too little. Voluntary funding simply does not generate sufficient income for modern 
political parties. As such, if we accept the case that healthy parties are an important 
aspect of democratic life, then the case for providing more comprehensive public 
assistance becomes stronger. 
 
Does additional spending lead to electoral payoffs (and is capping a good idea)? 
The Neill Committee proposed the capping of national expenditure limits at general 
elections. The likely outcome was predicted to make the electoral playing field at least a 
little more even – especially with the retention of the ban on advertising on broadcast 
media and the continuation of party election broadcasts. However, there is reason to 
argue that the assumption that increased spending will result in greater electoral payoffs 
is flawed.  
 Although a link between spending at constituency level on electoral success has 
been repeatedly demonstrated, at national level the link between spending and electoral 
payoffs is not conclusive. The only circumstances where there is a link is in the case of 
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Conservative incumbents, where an annual increase of £1,000 expenditure at 1963 
prices, produces a 0.004 per cent increase in Conservative poll ratings – a minute 
amount.
8
 On the face of it then, the case for introducing state funding to make the 
electoral playing field more even would not seem to be based on empirical investigation.  
 One might also ask whether it is desirable to limit campaign spending anyway. 
Campaigning raises public awareness of politics. It is also a form of political 
education. Since studies of constituency campaigning demonstrate that more intense 
campaigning boosts turnout, it is arguable that campaigning should not be 
discouraged by capping it. Spending caps may also provide a disincentive to donate. 
If income is largely driven by the electoral cycle, it is unlikely that parties will be able 
to stockpile resources for non-election years, since that would entail donors 
contributing in the knowledge that election expenditure (which has stimulated 
contributions) is to be limited. Such limitations would logically be a disincentive to 
make a contribution. 
Finally, capping party spending can diminish the parties’ ability to respond to 
campaigns by ‘third parties’. Whilst ‘third party’ election spending is restricted by the 
new legislation, the limits only apply to individual groups. If say, a series of interest 
groups were to campaign strongly against a party – say on fox-hunting, the age of 
consent and so on, a party would find itself having to fight several battles, but would still 
have its spending capped. As a consequence, one could argue that spending caps for 
parties are legitimate so long as there is only inter-party competition, but that parties are 
less able to cope with campaigns outside the conventional electoral process. This 
becomes especially apparent if we include the mass media as a ‘third party’. Of course, 
the mass media are not running campaigns as such, but by limiting the amount that 
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parties can spend at elections, we limit their ability to respond to campaigns, official or 
otherwise, by interest groups and the media.  
 
Is there a case for more comprehensive state funding? 
By analysing these three broad questions, the answer is mixed. It is difficult to support 
state funding on the grounds of more even electoral playing fields since there is little 
empirical support for the case that increased party spending enhances electoral 
payoffs at national level. Moreover, the evidence of capping national spending 
suggests that it had little impact in terms of evening out the contest and more on 
generating opportunity costs for parties. 
 Neither would comprehensive state funding necessarily provide a ‘cure’ for 
the recent episodes, which have prompted these discussions. Much of the comparative 
evidence suggests that party finance scandals continue to occur, despite the provision 
of extensive state assistance to parties. However, what the introduction of state 
funding would allow would be the capping of donations, which might at least alleviate 
some concerns. Certainly, such a move would be impractical without further state 
support. That said, it is worth emphasising that the Enron donation to Labour was 
itself relatively small, yet this did not prevent concerns arising. 
 Finally, however and perhaps most tellingly, we can see that the current means 
by which parties are funded does not cover the parties needs adequately. It provides 
adequate funding only at general elections and leads to parties routinely being in 
deficit. Worse still, it is not responsive to party performance. This leads to parties 
being poorly funded and having little prospect of having any impact on improving 
their plight. For this reason, there is a strong case for the introduction of more 
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comprehensive state funding if we consider parties to play an essential role in our 
democratic institutions. 
All of which begs the questions of whether the new regulations should have 
included more comprehensive state funding in the first place. In truth, it is too early to 
say – the Act has only been in place for a year and a half and the measure which Neill 
envisaged to negate the need for state funding may well yet bear fruit. It is also worth 
stressing the radicalism of the new Act. It established for the first time an electoral 
commission, regulation of donations, limited election spending, a moderate increase 
in state support and clarified the position of ‘third’ parties. More importantly, Neill’s 
proposals received all-party backing – a factor which contributed to proposals being 
accepted almost in their entirety. More extensive proposals, such as more 
comprehensive state funding would have been less likely at that time to receive such 
support. The result is that these radical proposals have become law with the 
possibility of further measures. Contrast this with proposals from the Houghton and 
Jenkins committees, which were shelved through a lack of political will. 
  
Conclusions: Next Step – State Funding? 
In spite of radical legislation, which has transformed British party finance, disquiet 
has not disappeared and calls for comprehensive state funding have increased. In a 
way, this is somewhat ironic. A traditional rebuff to those who called for state funding 
was that public opinion would oppose it for all manner of reasons, not least that tax 
payers would resent contributing to parties which they did not support. The irony is 
that at a time when parties are supposed to be unpopular (measured all too narrowly 
and misleadingly by focussing on electoral turnout), the calls for state funding are at 
their loudest.  
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 Yet the reasons for these louder calls are in many cases not based upon 
empirical investigation. To be blunt, the idea that state funding will automatically 
eliminate public disquiet is fanciful. That does not however mean that the extension of 
state funding is a bad idea - rather that any decision should be based on evaluating 
various criteria by empirical investigation. On this basis, a case can be made that state 
funding would neither guarantee a cure for public disquiet, nor would it make election 
contests more even. Despite common belief, it is very difficult to demonstrate that 
national party spending enhances electoral payoffs at anything but the most 
superficial level.  
However, empirical investigation does show that voluntary income is an 
ineffective and unresponsive way of funding parties. The general election cycle drives 
income and is not responsive to parties’ performances. Worse still, the financial needs 
of parties are constant, at both organisational and campaigning levels. The result is 
that at present, all parties face severe financial problems. And since they are 
fundamental to parliamentary democracy, it is not just the parties themselves who 
suffer. Thus there is a strong case to be made that more comprehensive state funding 
should be introduced to ensure that parliamentary democracy is properly funded. In 
short, do we want democracy ‘on the cheap?’ 
 For all that, of course, there is no guarantee that the Government will 
introduce state funding. The problems are not new and of course at the time of Neill, 
the Government (officially at least) shared the opposition towards this solution. But 
things have changed a little since then. Senior Labour figures are now indicating their 
support for the idea and there is consensus between all three main parties on at least a 
small extension of state funding to cover such things as the costs of e-democracy and 
the training of councillors. Moreover, if other trade unions follow the lead of the RMT 
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and cut their affiliation to the Labour Party, a philosophical conversion may become 
bolstered by practical concerns.  
Selling the policy as a ‘cure for scandals’ may nevertheless be politically 
expedient, since despite the evidence, it will be difficult to convince the public that 
the parties are ‘hard-up’. Moreover, such a move might well be attractive to Labour 
figures who wish to distance the party from the trade unions. State funding would be 
likely to accompany a cap on donations. If this cap were to include affiliations, then 
the role of the trade unions in Labour party politics could be significantly diminished. 
For all these reasons, it seems likely that state funding will be extended, 
though by how much, it is difficult to say at this stage. All of which leads to a further 
question – if more state funding is to be introduced, what should be the basis for the 
allocation of funds. Currently, past electoral support provides the basis for the 
distribution of state support. This is sensible on the basis of current levels of subsidy. 
However, should further monies be available, allocating these on the basis of votes 
obtained might well be seen to further enhance the distorting effect of the electoral 
system. If the case is made that the Liberal Democrats lose votes because of the 
mechanics of first-past-the post (on account of the ‘wasted vote’ thesis), then they will 
suffer twice when state finance is distributed. As a result, it may be preferable to 
allocate state subsidies on the basis of party membership. This would not be subject to 
the distorting effect of the electoral system to the same extent and would alleviate any 
threat of parties abandoning grass-roots participation on account of receiving more state 
money, since parties would have an incentive to recruit and retain members. In short, 
state funding based upon membership would have the potential to enhance political 
participation rather than just reflect past behaviour. For those reasons, such a formula is 
surely preferable. 
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